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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this case the principal issue we must decide is 
whether the offenses of wire fraud and tax evasion should 
be grouped together for sentencing purposes when the 
government stipulated that the conduct underlying the wire 
fraud charge was embezzlement. Appellant also raises an 
issue of his alleged entitlement to a downward departure 
for diminished mental capacity. 
 
I. 
 
On September 30, 1997, Francis X. Vitale entered a 
guilty plea to one count of wire fraud and one count of tax 
evasion pursuant to a plea agreement. He was charged in 
the wire fraud charge with causing $407,223.80 to be 
illegally wire transferred from Engelhard's account to an 
antique clock dealer in Switzerland. He was charged in the 
second count with failing to pay over $1,200,000 in income 
tax on taxable income of more than $3,700,000. 
 
The charges against Vitale stemmed from his 
embezzlement of approximately $12 million from his 
employer, Engelhard Corporation, between 1987 and 1996. 
Vitale used this money to acquire and restore antique 
clocks, which he displayed in what has been described as 
a museum type gallery in Spring Lake, New Jersey. Vitale 
himself states that his collection was one of thefinest of 
18th and 19th century European clocks. 
 
Vitale had been employed for more than thirteen years by 
Engelhard, a specialty chemical and metal products 
manufacturer, most notably as the vice president of 
strategic development and corporate affairs. He controlled a 
multi-million dollar budget for domestic and international 
marketing and communications and had sole and unlimited 
authority to approve at least a million dollars in 
international marketing expenditures. Vitale forwarded 
fabricated invoices to Engelhard's cash management office, 
which received authorization to wire funds on the bogus 
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invoices to named vendors who were, in fact, European 
clock dealers who sold antique clocks to Vitale's shop. In 
addition, Vitale solicited the owner of Dimensional 
Marketing, Inc. to wire transfer funds and send checks to 
various vendors under the guise of helping Engelhard with 
a purported budgeting problem. These payments, however, 
went to vendors of Vitale's clock company, with Vitale 
approving payment of the invoices. Vitale failed to report 
any of the embezzled funds on his income tax returns. 
 
When Vitale was confronted with these crimes by 
Engelhard's senior executives, he admitted his guilt and 
cooperated with Engelhard by providing complete 
restitution by selling his entire clock collection. Vitale's 
extraordinary cooperation in organizing the sale of his 
clocks was noted in several letters written by Engelhard 
employees. Vitale also volunteered full-time with the Boys & 
Girls Club of Trenton/Mercer Counties in 1997. 
 
Vitale also underwent psychiatric counseling. Dr. 
Ventano, Vitale's treating psychiatrist, opined that Vitale 
was not motivated by greed or accumulation of wealth; 
instead, he had an obsession with antique clocks which 
overpowered his sense of right and wrong. Ventano 
observed that Vitale knew what he was doing was wrong, 
but could not stop himself. 
 
This appeal concerns Vitale's sentence, which the district 
court calculated as follows: 
 
Count one: Wire Fraud 
 
       Base Offense Level [S2F1.1(a)]               6  
       Specific Offense Characteristic 
         (Loss of $10 million to $20 million) 
         [S2F1.1(b)(1)(P)]                         15 
       Specific Offense Characteristic 
         (More than minimal planning) 
         [S2F1.1(b)(2)(A)]                          2  
 
       Adjustment for Role in the Offense 
         (Abuse of trust) [S3B1.3]                  2  
 
       Adjusted Offense Level                      25 
 
Count Two: Tax Evasion 
 
Base Level 
  (Tax loss of $2,500,000 to $5,000,000) 
  [S2T1.1(a)(1) and S2T4.1(P)]                     21 
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Specific Offense Characteristic 
  (Failed to report source of income exceeding 
  $10,000 from criminal activity) [S2T1.1(b)(1)]   2  
 
       Adjusted Offense Level                     23 
 
The district court rejected Vitale's argument that the wire 
fraud and tax evasion counts should be grouped. Therefore, 
under the multiple-count rules of Chapter 3 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, Vitale's greater adjusted offense 
level of 25 was increased by two levels, based on the 
number of units, for a combined adjusted offense level of 
27. Three levels were deducted for acceptance of 
responsibility, for a total offense level of 24, which 
corresponds (with a Criminal History Category of I) to a 
range of 51 to 63 months incarceration. 
 
The court denied Vitale's request for a downward 
departure based on the government's alleged manipulation 
of the charging documents, app. at 94, and declined to 
further depart downward from the guideline range based 
upon Vitale's alleged reduced mental capacity, app. at 94. 
However, the court granted Vitale's motion for downward 
departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 due to Vitale's 
extraordinary acceptance of responsibility, restitution 
efforts, community service and post-offense rehabilitation. 
Thus, after all the calculations and the downward 
departure, Vitale was sentenced to thirty months 
imprisonment (concurrent on counts one and two), two 
years of supervised release (also concurrent on counts one 
and two), and 500 hours of community service. App. at 95- 
96. Vitale appeals. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
GROUPING 
 
Vitale argues that the district court erred in denying his 
request to group the two charges. We give deference to a 
district court's grouping decision, see United States v. 
Selingsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1426 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation 
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omitted), and we review its factual findings leading to a 
grouping determination for clear error, see United States v. 
Bush, 56 F.3d 536, 537-38 (3d Cir. 1995). However, we 
have plenary review of the district court's interpretation of 
the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Rudolph, 
137 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 
Vitale premises his argument for grouping on U.S.S.G. 
S 3D1.2, which instructs as follows: "All counts involving 
substantially the same harm shall be grouped together into 
a single Group." The Guideline then sets forth four 
circumstances which involve the same harm and in which 
counts are to be grouped together.1 The Guideline also lists 
certain offenses that must be grouped and certain offenses 
which are excluded from grouping. 
 
Vitale relies on the subsection that provides that counts 
involve "substantially the same harm" when, inter alia, one 
of the counts "embodies conduct that is treated as a 
specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, 
the guideline applicable to another of the counts." 
S 3D1.2(c). Vitale contends that because the offense level for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The relevant portion of the Guidelines for Groups of Closely Related 
Counts provides: 
 
       All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be grouped 
       together into a single Group. Counts involve substantially the same 
       harm within the meaning of this rule: 
 
       (a) When counts involve the same victim and the same act or 
       transaction. 
 
       (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or 
       transactions connected by a common criminal objective or 
       constituting part of a common scheme or plan. 
 
       (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a 
       specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the 
       guideline applicable to another of the counts. 
 
       (d) When the offense level is determined largely on the basis of 
the 
       total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a substance 
       involved, or some other measure of aggregate harm, or if the 
       offense behavior is ongoing or continuous in nature and the 
       offense guideline is written to cover such behavior. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2. 
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his tax count was increased two levels under S 2T1.1(b)(1) 
because the unreported income was derived from his 
criminal activity, i.e., the wire fraud charged in count one, 
the wire fraud "embodies conduct that is treated as a 
specific offense characteristic of the tax evasion count" and 
therefore grouping is required. 
 
This court dealt with a comparable situation in United 
States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1991), where 
defendant, a stockbroker who defrauded various vulnerable 
investors, pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one 
count of income tax evasion. Astorri sought to have the 
counts grouped under U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(c) arguing, as Vitale 
does, that "the fraud count embodies conduct treated as a 
specific offense characteristic under the tax evasion 
offense." Id. at 1056. We disagreed. We noted that because 
the Sentencing Commission listed the failure to report 
criminally-derived income as a Specific Offense 
Characteristic for tax evasion in order to deter concealment 
of such income, it would negate that deterrence were that 
designation the basis for grouping. Id. at 1057. 
 
It is difficult to see why our reasoning in Astorri is not 
apposite here. Like Astorri, Vitale pled guilty to wire fraud, 
18 U.S.C. S 1343, and tax evasion, 26 U.S.C.S 1701. As in 
Astorri, the counts here involve different victims (Engelhard 
and the United States), different harms, and different types 
of conduct. As explained in Astorri, the tax evasion count 
represents significant criminal conduct in addition to the 
fraud count, and therefore the two counts are not so closely 
related that such grouping is required. See also United 
States v. Bissell, 954 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1996) (refusing 
to group mail fraud and tax fraud counts in reliance on 
Astorri), aff'd, 142 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 1998) (Table). 
 
Vitale argues that this case is not controlled by Astorri 
because although he, like the defendant in Astorri, was 
charged with fraud, the government stipulated with him in 
the plea agreement that "the conduct underlying the wire 
fraud offense is embezzlement." App. at 16, P 8. Vitale then 
argues that grouping is appropriate when the government 
has brought charges of both embezzlement and tax evasion, 
an issue we left open in United States v. Lieberman, 971 
F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Lieberman was a former bank vice president who pled 
guilty to bank embezzlement and attempted income tax 
evasion. In setting the sentence, the district court departed 
downward for inappropriate manipulation of the 
indictment, and the government appealed. We upheld the 
district court's discretion in that regard, and, in the course 
of our discussion, observed that Lieberman made a 
plausible argument that "a case involving tax evasion and 
embezzlement, which necessarily involves a taking of 
moneys, funds, assets or securities, is distinguishable from 
a case involving tax evasion and wire fraud, which does not 
necessarily generate criminally-derived income by the 
taking of money or property, [but] we leave that issue for 
another day." Id. at 997 (citations, footnotes, and quotation 
omitted). 
 
There are several significant differences in this case from 
Lieberman. In the first place, in Lieberman we were 
affirming a discretionary sentencing decision of the district 
court. That is far different from using a similar argument to 
overturn the district court's choice of a sentence. In the 
second place, Vitale was indeed charged with fraud like 
Astorri, not with embezzlement, like Lieberman. In fact, 
there is no federal embezzlement charge that would have 
covered Vitale's actions. Finally, we did not hold in 
Lieberman that charges of embezzlement and tax evasion 
must be grouped; on the contrary, we left that issue for 
another day. As Vitale was not charged with embezzlement, 
this is not that other day. 
 
Even though we believe the holding of Astorri is 
dispositive, we will consider Vitale's argument that he was 
entitled to have his offenses grouped under S 3D1.2(c). A 
defendant in Vitale's position would be substantially 
advantaged by grouping. If the counts were not grouped, 
under the multiple-count rules set forth in S 3D1.4 the 
offense level is determined by adding the requisite number 
of levels (one for the wire fraud count and one for the tax 
evasion count) to the higher offense level (25) applicable to 
wire fraud. This leads to an offense level of 27. On the other 
hand, if the counts were grouped under S 3D1.3, the 
offense level would be determined by the higher offense 
level, which is the 25 applicable to wire fraud. 
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If Vitale is correct that the tax evasion count should be 
grouped with the wire fraud count, there would be no 
accounting in the sentence for the fact that Vitale had 
evaded taxes, and in effect his conviction on that count 
would be washed away. However, the offense level for tax 
evasion is enhanced two levels under S 2T1.1(b)(1) because 
the defendant has failed to report income acquired from 
criminal activity. In other words, the enhancement is 
designed to deter and punish tax evaders who fail to report 
illegally-acquired income. See S 2T1.1(b)(1) and Background 
Commentary. Thus, under Vitale's interpretation, we would 
have the anomalous result that an enhancement designed 
to increase a sentence has the effect of reducing it. We see 
nothing in the guidelines for grouping that requires that 
result. 
 
Vitale's textual argument is dependent upon interpreting 
the phrase that appears in the grouping guideline, "conduct 
that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or 
other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of 
the counts," to encompass every "adjustment" to the offense 
level, whatever its consequence. The two-level enhancement 
to the tax evasion count (raising it from level 21 to 23) 
cannot affect the offense level of the higher wire fraud 
charge (25) which is the offense level used for the ultimate 
sentence, whether or not there has been grouping. Nor, in 
this instance, can it affect the multiple count enhancement 
under the formula in S 3D1.4. Because the two point 
adjustment to the tax evasion offense level has no 
significance to and does not in fact adjust the overall 
sentence, it does not cause the kind of "adjustment" 
referred to in S 3D1.2(c). We reject Vitale's textual 
argument. 
 
We also believe it is contrary to the policies under the 
Guidelines. Although grouping is designed to "limit the 
significance of the formal charging decision and to prevent 
multiple punishment for substantially identical offense 
conduct," U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Part D, Intro. Commentary, P 4, 
it is still supposed to provide "incremental punishment for 
significant additional criminal conduct." See U.S.S.G. Ch. 
3, Part D, Intro. Commentary, P 2; see Bush, 56 F.3d at 
538. Evading taxes on $12 million is patently "significant 
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additional criminal conduct" which would not be punished 
were Vitale's interpretation of S 3D1.2(c) to prevail. It would 
be an unreasonable application if S 3D1.2(c) were to apply 
in these circumstances and we decline to construe grouping 
unreasonably. It is significant that the grouping section is 
titled "Groups of Closely Related Counts;" and patently tax 
evasion and wire fraud are not closely related offenses. 
 
We are not persuaded by the recent opinion in United 
States v. Haltom, 113 F.3d 43 (5th Cir. 1997), on which 
Vitale relies. There, like here, defendant was convicted of 
fraud and tax evasion. Although the court recognized that 
the mail fraud and tax evasion convictions did not cause 
"substantially the same harm," because the criminal 
activity associated with each count harmed different 
victims, it held they must be grouped because the mail 
fraud count "embodies conduct that is treated as a specific 
offense characteristic" of the tax evasion count. Id. at 46 
(citing U.S.S.G. S 3D1.2(c)). As noted above, we disagree. 
The Haltom opinion discussed that there, unlike here, the 
tax evasion enhancement affected the defendant'sfinal 
offense level. See id. at 47 n.5. Whatever the rationale in 
Haltom, we decline to construe S 3D1.2(c) to encompass an 
adjustment effected by the tax evasion enhancement in a 
situation where the final offense level is not in fact 
adjusted. 
 
We are also unpersuaded by Vitale's reliance upon the 
responses given in the Sentencing Commission's Most 
Frequently Asked Questions About the Sentencing 
Guidelines, Volume VII, Question No. 45, construing 
U.S.S.G. SS 3D1.2(c) and 2T1.1(b)(1). The response, which 
apparently emanated from the staff, is to the effect that tax 
evasion and the conduct generating the income should 
"always" be grouped, regardless of whether an 
enhancement under S 2T1.1(b)(1) was applied. The response 
fails to address circumstances where an intended penalty is 
transformed into a sentence reduction. Moreover, this 
section of the response includes a disclaimer: 
 
       Information provided by the Commission's Training 
       Staff is offered to assist in understanding and applying 
       the sentencing guidelines. This information does not 
       necessarily represent the official position of the 
 
                                9 
  
       Commission, should not be considered definitive, and 
       is not binding on the Commission, the courts, or the 
       parties in any case. 
 
Id. Under the circumstances, we accord no weight to the 
response. 
 
Finally, we note that in this case the district court made 
a substantial downward departure based on Vitale's 
acceptance of responsibility, service and rehabilitation. The 
30-months sentence represents a 21-month departure from 
the bottom of the sentencing range. Vitale has shown 
nothing in the record to support his view that the district 
court would have departed yet further had grouping been 
utilized. Although we do not base our disposition on 
harmless error because we find no error, we note this fact 
in passing. 
 
Accordingly, we find that the district court properly found 
that grouping under these facts was improper and we will 
affirm the district court on this issue. 
 
B. 
 
MANIPULATION OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENTS 
 
Vitale's challenge to the district court's refusal to grant a 
downward departure for manipulation of the charging 
document does not differ in essence from his grouping 
argument. Relying upon Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 
1992), Vitale asserts that a downward departure is proper 
to compensate for the multiple counts when grouping is 
unavailable. Assuming that is so, our statement in 
Lieberman that nothing "forecloses the district courts from 
using their departure power to correct unwarranted 
sentencing disparities caused by charging decisions," id. at 
998, does not suggest departure is required. 
 
Here, the district court clearly understood it had power to 
depart but declined to exercise it. See app. at 94 ("[T]he 
question of manipulating the charging documents is one 
that in keeping with my discretion I choose not to 
entertain."). Accordingly, in the absence of any legal error 
by the district court regarding its power to depart, we lack 
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jurisdiction to consider whether the district court properly 
exercised its discretion. See United States v. Casiano, 113 
F.3d 420, 429 (3d Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 118 
S.Ct. 221 (1997); United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 668 
n.11 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
C. 
 
DIMINISHED MENTAL CAPACITY 
 
Vitale contends that the district court erroneously 
believed it lacked the authority to grant a downward 
departure based on Vitale's diminished mental capacity, in 
particular, his compulsion to purchase antique clocks. We 
do not read the district court as so stating. UnderS 5K2.13, 
a departure may be granted where a defendant (1) has 
committed a non-violent offense, (2) while suffering from a 
significantly reduced mental capacity, (3) that was not 
caused by the voluntary use of intoxicants, (4) where 
defendant's mental incapacity contributed to the 
commission of the offense, and (5) so long as the 
defendant's criminal record does not indicate a need for 
imprisonment to protect public safety. See U.S.S.G. 
S 5K2.13. 
 
Following the analysis used by the Supreme Court in 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996), we stated in 
United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533 (3d Cir. 1997), that 
"[w]ith limited exceptions, mental and emotional conditions 
are discouraged factors; that is, they are not ordinarily 
relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted." 
Id. at 538. Vitale relies on the Guideline that provides that 
a sentence may be reduced to reflect "the extent to which 
reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of 
the offense." U.S.S.G. S 5K2.13, and our remand in 
McBroom so that the district court could consider whether 
the evidence that McBroom "suffered from obsessive- 
compulsive disorder complicated by Cyclothymia, an after- 
effect of his childhood sexual abuse and a significant 
contributing factor in his possession of child pornography" 
warranted a departure on that ground. Id. at 550. 
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We review the district court's refusal to grant a downward 
departure due to Vitale's compulsion to purchase antique 
clocks for abuse of discretion. Koon, 518 US. at 98. In its 
analysis, the district court noted that disorders such as 
gambling and intoxication do not ordinarily warrant a 
diminished capacity reduction. App. at 91. The court also 
noted the length of time and sophistication of Vitale's 
criminal activities, and commented that Vitale did not use 
his personal money but only money obtained from his 
employer to feed his clock compulsion. See App. at 91-92. 
The court concluded that compared with other cases 
Vitale's compulsion did not rise to a level that warranted a 
downward departure. Because the district court did not 
misinterpret its authority and committed no error of law, 
we have no jurisdiction over its decision not to depart on 
this ground as well. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment 
of conviction and sentence. 
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FULLAM, Senior Circuit Judge, Concurring. 
 
I concur in the judgment, because we are bound by the 
panel opinion in U.S. v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052 (1991). I 
believe, however, that the reasons given by the Astorri 
panel, and the majority's further elaboration of that 
reasoning, are incorrect. 
 
Section 3D1.2(c) of the Guidelines clearly requires 
grouping of the counts in this situation, since the criminal 
conduct embodied in the mail fraud count is a specific 
offense characteristic of the tax count. Contrary to the view 
of the majority, this does not in any way frustrate the 
intent of the Commission to treat tax cases more harshly if 
the unreported income came from criminal activity. The 
guideline range for the tax count is still increased by two 
points. And under the grouping analysis, this would be 
directly reflected in the actual sentence, if the tax count 
were the more serious of the two counts. The anomaly 
perceived by the majority is entirely due to the fact that, 
here, the fraud count carries a higher guideline range, and 
concurrent sentencing is mandatory. The conduct which 
aggravated the tax violation is being punished in the fraud 
count. 
 
It should be noted that all "specific offense 
characteristics" enhance the guideline range; accepting the 
majority's reasoning, there could never be grouping of 
counts on that basis; Guideline 3D1.2(c) would be a dead 
letter. 
 
If free to do so, I would adopt the bright-line rule 
espoused by the staff of the Commission, and accepted by 
our sister-circuit in U.S. v. Haltom, 113 F.3d 43 (5th Cir. 
1997). This is not, I respectfully suggest, an issue which 
should divide the circuits. 
 
A True Copy: 
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